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Introduction
Moral acceptance is noncognitive. SpeciWcally, moral acceptance
centrally involves a certain kind of aVect, what Scanlon (1998)
describes as a desire in the directed attention sense. In accepting a
moral sentence that he understands, a competent speaker
reconWgures his aVective sensibility so as to render salient, in a
phenomenologically vivid manner, the moral reasons apparently
available in the circumstance, as he understands it. In accepting a
moral sentence that he understands, a competent speaker quite
literally decides how he feels about things. It is the structure of a
person’s moral consciousness and not some further fact that
constitutes the relevant kind of aVect. The relevant aVect is
nothing over and above the tendency for certain features of the
circumstance to become salient in perception, thought, and
imagination, and for these to present a certain complex norma-
tive appearance. SpeciWcally, certain features of the circumstance
become salient and appear to be reasons for acting, while other
features potentially cease to be salient and can appear to be
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outweighed or even ruled out as reasons for doing otherwise,
even if, in normal circumstances, they would count as such
reasons. The salient features appear to be reasons that are not
contingent upon our acceptance of them. Moreover, potentially
distinct features of the circumstance become salient and appear
to be reasons for accepting the moral sentence, and these reasons
directly or indirectly involve grounding reasons, i.e. reasons that
ground the deontic status of the relevant practical alternatives.
These grounding reasons appear to be reasons not only for the
speaker, but for everyone else as well. They appear to be suY-
cient for accepting that sentence on behalf of others. From this
perspective, the competent speaker can seem justiWed in
demanding that others accept the moral sentence and so come
to respond aVectively in the relevant manner. The eVects cen-
trally involved in moral acceptance are in this way essentially
other regarding.
In uttering a moral sentence that he understands, a competent
speaker conveys the relevant aVect and implicitly demands that
others come to respond aVectively in the relevant manner.
A moral utterance frames the perspective of its audience so as
to induce the relevant aVect. Notice that such framing eVects are
a hallmark of Wgurative language. Suppose that Bernice, in
remarking about Edgar’s gravitas, represents Edgar as a pear.
Emma, in appreciating the aptness of Bernice’s remark, cannot
now but see Edgar as pear-shaped. Bernice’s Wgure of speech has
framed Emma’s perspective so as to render salient, in a phenom-
enologically vivid manner, certain relevant dimensions of simi-
larity between Edgar and pears. So, whereas the Wctional content
of Bernice’s remark represents Edgar as a pear, its real content
merely represents Edgar as pear-shaped. Moreover, the Wctional
content plays a role in this framing eVect by focusing on the
relevant features of the circumstance and by representing them
in a certain qualitative light. So in accepting the aptness of this
remark, Emma has a tendency to focus on certain features of the
Kalderon/Moral Fictionalism 04-Kalderon-chap04 Page Proof page 148 19.11.2004 10:25pm
148  Attitude, Affect, and Authority
circumstance in perception, thought, and imagination, and a
tendency for these features to have a certain qualitative appear-
ance. Similarly, in accepting a moral sentence that he under-
stands, the moral proposition expressed by the accepted
sentence frames the perspective of the competent speaker so as
to render salient, in a phenomenologically vivid manner, the
moral reasons apparently available in the given circumstance as
he understand it. So, whereas the Wctional content of a moral
utterance is the moral proposition expressed, its real content is
plausibly limited to the morally salient features of the circum-
stance. Moreover, the Wctional content plays a role in this
framing eVect by focusing on the relevant features of the circum-
stance and representing them in a certain normative light. So in
accepting a moral sentence, a competent speaker has a tendency
to focus on certain features of the circumstance in perception,
thought, and imagination, and there is also a tendency for these
features to have a certain complex normative appearance. The
moral proposition expressed by the accepted moral sentence
functions as an apt moral trope that frames the perspective of a
virtuous moral sensibility.
A moral utterance conveys how a speaker feels about things. It
does so not by virtue of an expressivist semantics that determines
a nonfactualist interpretation for it. In reasoning from the non-
representational function of moral utterance (in this instance, its
framing eVects) to the accepted moral sentence having a non-
representational content, the expressivist plausibly conXates dis-
tinct senses of ‘represent.’ Moral discourse may be fully
representational, moral sentences may express propositions that
attribute moral properties to things, but the acceptance of a
moral sentence might not be belief in the moral proposition
expressed but, rather, the relevant kind of aVect. Thus, for
example, in accepting that the rights people have over their
own persons ground the permissibility of abortion, Edgar has a
tendency to focus on a certain feature of the circumstance, the
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embryo being essentially a part of the mother’s body, and a
tendency for this feature to have a certain normative appearance.
In uttering this claim, Edgar conveys this aVect and implicitly
demands that others come to respond aVectively in the relevant
manner. Edgar conveys the relevant aVect in part by conveying
the relevant normative appearance. Moreover, Edgar conveys the
relevant normative appearance by representing what it is an
appearance of. In representing the embryo’s being essentially
part of the mother as the ground of her right to make an
uncoerced decision to abort, Edgar makes public and so conveys
the relevant normative appearance. The represented moral prop-
erty is an objective correlative of the relevant aVect. Moral
propositions may constitute the Wctional content of moral ac-
ceptance and utterance, but they do not constitute their real
content (which is plausibly limited to representing the morally
salient features of the given circumstance). Moral propositions,
propositions that attribute moral properties to things, play a role
in moral acceptance and utterance, not by being the objects of
belief and assertion, but by being apt moral tropes that frame the
perspective of a virtuous moral sensibility.
What makes it Wctionally true that things instantiate moral
properties? What makes an action good or just within the moral
Wction? A schematic answer is available:
Suppose that moral predicate ‘F’ denotes moral property p. It
is Wctionally true that x is F iV x instantiates nonmoral prop-
erty p that would elicit the relevant aVective response in a
person with a virtuous moral sensibility.
Since diVerent attributions of moral properties diVerently
structure the apparent reasons available in a given circumstance,
we can be sure that diVerent moral properties are paired with
diVerent aVects. However, as we discussed in the previous chap-
ter, there is no noncircular way to accurately specify the aVect
paired with the moral property. The aVect is a desire in the
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directed attention sense, so accurately specifying that aVect
would involve accurately specifying the constituent normative
appearance, and the only way of accurately specifying the con-
stituent normative appearance is in terms of what it is an ap-
pearance of. However, the semantic indispensability of moral
properties is no more problematic for a Wctionalist interpretation
of moral discourse than the semantic indispensability of meta-
phor is for a Wctionalist interpretation of metaphorical discourse
(see Hills, 1997, and Walton, 1993). Just as there is no noncircular
way to accurately specify the relevant aVective response, there is
no noncircular way to accurately specify the kind of sensibility
from which this response is elicited. It is the reasons apparently
available from the perspective of a virtuous moral sensibility that
constitute the relevant aVect. (DiVerent conceptions of moral
virtue are possible and, if actually implemented in moral prac-
tice, would generate diVerent and potentially competing moral
Wctions.) This is unobjectionable. Suppose that theology is a
Wction. It would not be surprising that a range of aVective
responses were available only to the participants of a theological
Wction—that it is only within the theological Wction that one
could regard things as sacred or holy. Similarly, it should not be
surprising that a range of aVective responses are available only to
the participants of a moral Wction—that it is only within the
moral Wction that one could feel beneWcent or just.
Within the moral Wction, there are facts about the existence
and distribution of moral properties. Moreover, competent
speakers accept sentences that attribute moral properties to
things. It is natural, then, that within the moral Wction the
acceptance of a moral sentence is belief about the attributed
moral property—that it is Wctionally true of a competent speaker
that he believes the moral proposition expressed by the moral
sentence he accepts. In accepting a moral sentence, a competent
speaker does not so much believe the moral proposition ex-
pressed as he makes as if to believe that proposition, where
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making as if to believe, in this context, is to be disposed to
respond aVectively in the relevant manner. Acceptance in moral
inquiry functions less to represent moral reality than to trans-
formmoral character by enabling competent speakers to respond
aVectively the way a virtuous person would. The aim of moral
inquiry is not moral truth, but moral transformation.
Could We Discover that Morality was a Fiction?
What would be the rational response to the discovery that
morality is a Wction?
There are both general and more speciWc questions here. The
general question is: What would the rational response be to the
discovery that morality is a Wction where at issue is the Wctional
status of morality and not the speciWc character of the moral
Wction? A speciWc question is: What would the rational response
be to the discovery that morality is a Wction if it had the character
described in the previous section? Whatever the answer to that
question is, the verdict might not be general. It might be the
speciWc character of the moral Wction and not its Wctional status
that prompts the relevant response. In this chapter we will
consider both questions.
This presupposes that we could, in fact, discover that morality
is a Wction, but a doubt might be registered about this. Compe-
tent speakers unhesitantly describe their acceptance of a moral
sentence S as believing that S. Could it really be the case that our
attributions of moral belief are simply an unwitting pretense? So
before we proceed, wewill consider the prior question: Could we
discover that morality is a Wction?
In Chapter 3 I argued that there were limits to the hermen-
eutic ambitions of moral Wctionalism.While moral Wctionalism is
not necessarily committed to revising any of our distinctively
moral commitments, it is committed to revising certain sophis-
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ticated epistemological and linguistic beliefs. In accepting a
moral sentence, competent speakers take themselves to believe
the moral proposition expressed; and in uttering a moral sen-
tence, competent speakers take themselves to be asserting the
moral proposition expressed. But if Wctionalism is true, then
competent speakers are systematically misconceiving what they
are in fact doing when they accept and utter a moral sentence.
According to hermeneutic moral Wctionalism, moral acceptance
is best understood as some attitude other than belief in a moral
proposition, and moral utterance is best understood as some
linguistic action other than the assertion of a moral proposition.
We might be justiWed in accepting most of the central moral
claims that we in fact accept, at least by the norms of acceptance
internal to moral practice, but we might nevertheless be wrong
in describing our acceptance of these claims as beliefs and our
utterance of them as assertion. Notice, however, that the claim
that the acceptance of a moral sentence is not belief in the moral
proposition expressed is not itself a moral claim: rather, it is an
epistemological claim about the nature of the attitude involved
in accepting a moral claim. Similarly, the claim that the utterance
of a moral sentence is not the assertion of the moral proposition
expressed is not itself a moral claim: rather, it is a linguistic claim
about the nature of the action performed by moral utterance.
Competent speakers may be right about the moral claims that
they in fact accept but may systematically misunderstand what
they are in fact doing when they accept and utter such claims.
While hermeneutic moral Wctionalism is not necessarily
committed to any distinctively moral error, nevertheless, the
fact that competent speakers so badly misconceive what they
are in fact doing in accepting and uttering moral sentences might
strike some as incredible. Don’t we know what we are doing
whenwe accept and utter moral sentences? (This objection is not
conWned to the special case of moral Wctionalism. Indeed, Stan-
ley, 2001, presses this objection against any form of hermeneutic
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Wctionalism.) The challenge is to make it intelligible that com-
petent speakers mistake what they are doing in accepting and
uttering moral sentences without making the mistake impossible
to discover. Indeed, there are several reasons why we might
intelligibly be the unwitting participants of a moral Wction.
First, our attitudes and actions are not always fully transparent
to us. Thus, it is plausible, for example, that a friend could be in a
better position than you are to know that you are envious of
a colleague and that a pattern of behavior that you have engaged
in is an expression of that envy. Indeed, if your friend were to
confront you and baldly assert that you are envious, you might
initially deny it. However, if he were then to discuss the history of
your relationship with your colleague and your behavior as seen
from without, you might come, over time, to recognize what
you initially denied. If this is indeed possible, then it is possible as
well that an alien ethnographer could be in a better position than
a native speaker to discover that in accepting moral sentences
competent speakers do not believe the moral propositions ex-
pressed, and that in uttering moral sentences they are not assert-
ing the propositions expressed. If the alien ethnographer were to
confront a native speaker and baldly assert that his moral practice
is Wctionalist, the speaker might initially deny it. However, if the
alien ethnographer were carefully to review the linguistic and
ethnographic evidence with an open minded member of the
linguistic community, such a speaker might come, over time,
to believe that he was wrong all along about moral acceptance
and utterance—that moral acceptance is not, in fact, belief in a
moral proposition and moral utterance is not, in fact, the asser-
tion of a moral proposition.
Second, one could not discover that morality was a Wction
merely by reXecting on the content of moral vocabulary. Con-
sider two possible worlds, w and w. Both are near duplicates, the
population of each speaks a moral language with identical moral
vocabulary with the same representational content. However, in
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w, when a competent speaker accepts a moral sentence he
believes the moral proposition expressed, and when he utters a
moral sentence he asserts that proposition. In contrast, in w,
when a competent speaker accepts a moral sentences he does
not believe the moral proposition expressed but adopts some
other attitude, and when he utters a moral sentence he does not
assert that proposition but performs the distinct linguistic action
of quasi-assertion. If a speaker were to determine whether he was
an inhabitant of w or w, he could not do so merely by reXecting
on the content of moral vocabulary. By hypothesis, moral con-
tent is invariant across w and w. Semantic knowledge would not
determine his location in modal space.
Third, it is not just that reXection on moral content would not
reveal that morality was a Wction; in addition, reXection on moral
content might tend to conceal that morality was a Wction if in fact
it was. If, in reXecting on the contents of the moral sentences that
he accepts, a competent speaker recognizes the representational
nature of that content, he might naturally take himself to believe
the propositions expressed and to be asserting them when mak-
ing moral utterances. If moral content were representational,
then in accepting and uttering moral sentences a competent
speaker might naturally take himself to be representing the
moral facts to himself and others. The speaker’s mistake might
be encouraged by the systematic ambiguity in our representa-
tional idiom. Sometimes by ‘representing o as F’ we mean that
the proposition that o is F is being put forward as true. Some-
times by ‘representing o as F’ we mean that the proposition that
o is F is expressed whether or not that proposition is being put
forward as true. In the former sense a representation is being
put forward as true; in the latter sense the content of a repre-
sentation is being speciWed whether or not that representation is
being put forward as true. However, if a speaker were unclear
about the distinction, then he might mistake the purported
representation of putative moral facts for the successful
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representation of such facts, and so mistake a noncognitive moral
Wction for the cognition of the moral facts.
Moreover, there is a sense in which the cognitive appearance
of moral discourse is both intelligible and predictable, given a
Wctionalist interpretation. After all, according to moral Wctional-
ism, when a competent speaker accepts a moral sentence, he
does not so much believe as makes as if to believe the moral
proposition expressed. Making as if to believe, in this context,
essentially involves adopting the relevant kind of aVective re-
sponse. Mistaking making as if to believe for belief is facilitated
by the fact that attributions of moral belief are true within the
moral Wction. The conditions that make a moral claim pretense-
worthy for a competent speaker, if they obtain, also make the
ascription of moral belief to that speaker pretense-worthy. That
people believe the moral claims that they accept would be part of
the extended moral Wction. Moreover, if attributions of moral
belief are Wctionally true, and moral pretense is unwitting, then it
would be easy to mistake the Wctional truth of such attributions
for genuine truth, and so mistake a noncognitive moral Wction
for the cognition of the moral facts.
What If Morality Were a Fiction?
Suppose we discovered that morality was a Wction. What would
the rational response to the discovery be? Two observations are
relevant here.
First, while a moral claim might be acceptable, given the
norms internal to moral practice, nevertheless the acceptance
of that claim might be illegitimate or unjustiWed by some rele-
vant norm external to that practice. Compare: That Mercury
rising has an unsettling eVect on a person’s psychology might be
acceptable by the norms internal to astrology, but that does not
mean that the claim is acceptable full stop. Suppose we reject
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astrology; then the claim is not acceptable given the norms
external to astrology that we accept and regard as authoritative.
So it is one thing for a claim to be acceptable by the norms
internal to a practice and another for it to be genuinely accept-
able from the perspective of our overall practice.
Second, in Chapter 3 I remarked that it was unobvious what
the commitments embodied in our use of moral language have
to do with the metaphysics of morals. After all, the metaphysical
commitments of a person as embodied in his use of language
is one thing, and reality quite another. I argued that moral
realism and its alternatives are better understood as epistemo-
logical postures or stances that are articulated in terms of
the commitments involved in moral discourse. This point is
presently important because moral Wctionalism is consistent
with the existence of moral facts. A competent speaker’s accept-
ing a moral sentence might consist in a noncognitive attitude,
but this is nonetheless perfectly consistent with the existence of
moral facts.
These two observations combine in an obvious way. Suppose
the norms governing moral acceptance were noncognitive.
A moral claim might be acceptable by the norms internal to
moral practice, but might not itself be acceptable because, let us
suppose, it did not correctly represent the moral facts. Even
though a moral claim is acceptable by the norms internal to
moral practice, it might not be genuinely acceptable by norms
appropriate to the cognition of the moral facts if indeed there
were any. Moreover, if there were, then, while the acceptance of
a moral claim might be justiWed by the norms internal to moral
practice, the acceptance of that claim might be unjustiWed
nonetheless.
This possibility, if actual, would constitute not only an epi-
stemic diYculty, but a normative diYculty as well.
In accepting a moral sentence, a competent speaker accepts as
well what reason is thereby provided. The reason involved in
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accepting a moral sentence (and conveyed in uttering that sen-
tence) diVers importantly from other reasons that the speaker
might have. Moral reasons seem to have an authority that non-
moral reasons lack. While I did not give anything like a full
account of the authority of morality in Chapter 1, I did describe
the role it plays in moral discourse and in the cognitive psych-
ology of competent speakers. One important feature of the
authority of morality is the precedence that moral reasons take
over nonmoral reasons. SpeciWcally, in accepting a moral sen-
tence, a competent speaker accepts as well a reason to act or to
refrain from acting in a given circumstance that potentially
overrides or cancels any conXicting nonmoral reasons available
in that circumstance. So moral reasons diVer from nonmoral
reasons in that the former possesses an authority that the latter
lacks—a fact that is manifest in the precedence that moral
reasons take over nonmoral reasons. The authority of morality
is manifest in other ways as well. Not only does a competent
speaker, in accepting a moral sentence that he understands,
accept a reason that takes precedence over nonmoral reasons,
but he also accepts a reason that is not contingent upon his
acceptance of it, for which there are grounds not only for him
but for everyone to accept, where such grounds potentially
justify demanding that others accept that sentence.
Suppose that, in accepting a moral sentence by the noncogni-
tive norms of acceptance internal to moral practice, a competent
speaker accepts as well a genuine reason. There nevertheless
remains the question whether the accepted reason is a moral
reason with the requisite authority. Suppose that a moral reason
is a moral fact, or, at the very least, that the features of a given
circumstance that count as a moral reason constitute a moral
fact. Then in accepting a moral sentence by noncognitive stand-
ards of acceptance, a competent speaker would be mistaking a
nonmoral reason for a moral reason. Indeed, he would be
endowing the nonmoral reason involved in the acceptance of a
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moral sentence with the authority appropriate only to moral
reasons. He would, for example, mistakenly treat the reason he
accepts as having precedence over other reasons available in the
given circumstance. Moreover, he would fail to recognize when
the nonmoral reason that he accepts is overridden or cancelled
by a competing moral reason available in the given circumstance.
So not only would a competent speaker be misconceiving the
nature of the reason that he accepts in accepting a moral claim,
but he might be accepting no legitimate reason at all.
Morality in Plato’s Cave
This is the situation that MacIntyre (1981: chapter 2) describes the
Bloomsbury group as being in. According to MacIntyre, there
was a radical discrepancy between meaning and use in the moral
discourse of the Bloomsbury group. Given the meaning of moral
vocabulary, the acceptance of a moral sentence seemed to in-
volve the acceptance of a reason with the requisite authority.
However, given the use of moral vocabulary, the acceptance of a
moral sentence actually involved the acceptance of a nonmoral
reason that lacked this authority. SpeciWcally, their acceptance of
a moral sentence was not governed by norms appropriate to the
cognition of the moral proposition expressed (where the nature
of the represented fact was the alleged ground of the authority of
the accepted reason); rather, their acceptance of a moral sen-
tence was governed by noncognitive norms. (For present pur-
poses, what really happened in WC1 is irrelevant. What is
presently important is that MacIntyre’s account might be true,
if not of the Bloomsbury group as they actually were, then of
how they nearly might have been.)
According to G.E. Moore (1903), moral properties are nonna-
tural properties that can be intuited by persons with the appro-
priate moral sensibilities. Not only was Moore a nonnaturalist
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and an intuitionist, but he was a consequentialist as well: an
action is right in a given circumstances just in case it produces
more good consequences than any alternative action that is open
in that circumstance. Moreover, Moore held a speciWc concep-
tion of the good: those things that instantiate nonnatural good-
ness to the greatest degree are personal intercourse and the
beautiful.
According to MacIntyre, the Bloomsbury group embraced
Moore’s moral philosophy not on the strength of Moore’s argu-
ments, but rather because Moore’s moral philosophy reXected
the values they antecedently accepted. Their preferred form of
life privileged the values of personal intercourse and the beauti-
ful, just as Moore prescribed. Not only did the Bloomsbury
group share Moore’s conception of the good, but they were
also disposed towards consequentialist forms of moral reasoning.
Keynes reports that discussions of value involved the explicit
ranking of states of aVairs. He cites the following questions put
forward for discussion:
If A was in love with B and believed that B reciprocated his feelings,
whereas in fact B did not, but was in love with C, the state of aVairs was
certainly not as good as it would have been if A had been right, but was
it worse or better than it would become if A discovered his mistake?
If Awas in love with B under a misapprehension as to B’s qualities, was
this better or worse than A’s not being in love at all? (MacIntyre, 1981:
16–17)
Moreover, such questions were resolved by appeal to intuition.
The Bloomsbury group would focus on the target state of aVairs
and attempt to discern as best they could the presence and
degree of nonnatural goodness instantiated in the target state
of aVairs. If there was disagreement, then either the disputants
were focusing on diVerent subject matters, or the moral sensibil-
ity of one was better placed to discern the presence and degree of
nonnatural goodness than that of the other.
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So it would seem that the moral practice of the Bloomsbury
group was thus explicitly intuitionist—at least on the surface:
But, of course, as Keynes tells us, what was really happening was
something quite other: ‘In practice, victory was with those who
could speak with the greatest appearance of clear, undoubting convic-
tion and could best use the accents of infallibility’ and Keynes goes on
to describe the eVectiveness of Moore’s gasps of incredulity and head-
shaking, or Strachey’s grim silences and Lowes Dickenson’s shrugs.
(MacIntyre, 1981: 17)
If Keynes is to be believed, this is plainly the kind of manipu-
lative noncognitivism for which Moore’s student, Stevenson, has
been criticized. On this view, the Bloomsbury group, in accepting
an attribution of goodness, was not in fact tracking the presence
and degree of nonnatural goodness. Rather, they were engaged
in an unwitting pretense inwhich things have, in addition to their
natural properties, certain nonnatural properties that supervene
on them and that can be intuited by persons with the appropriate
moral sensibilities.
Suppose that Edgar was a minor member of the Bloomsbury
group. Being a faithful student of the Principia, Edgar under-
stands the sentence
A’s being in love with B under a misapprehension of B’s
qualities would be a better state of aVairs than A’s never
being in love
as Moore does—as representing a diVerence in the degree of
nonnatural goodness instantiated by two potential states of
aVairs. Moreover, Edgar accepts this sentence. In what does
Edgar’s acceptance of this sentence consist? From within, Edgar’s
coming to accept this sentence occurred just as Moore describes:
Edgar contemplates A’s being in love under a misapprehension
and A’s never being in love and intuits that the former state of
aVairs instantiates nonnatural goodness to a degree greater than
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the latter. However, Edgar’s intuition can be explained independ-
ently of the actual intuition of any nonnatural properties. Edgar
accepts that A’s being in love under a misapprehension is better
that A’s never being in love because, given his sensibility, Edgar
approves of the former state of aVairs more than he does the
latter.
So there were two complementary principles governing this
pretense. First, Moore’s Principia, regardless of the truth of its
doctrines, functioned as the master Wction of the moral pretense.
In accepting and uttering moral sentences, the Bloomsbury
group were acting as if the Principia doctrines correctly described
the moral facts. If we conWne our attention to attributions of
nonnatural goodness, a rough statement of one principle govern-
ing the moral Wction would be:
It is Wctionally true that x instantiates nonnatural goodness
iV according to the Principia, x instantiates nonnatural
goodness.
Not only did the Principia prescribe, at least in general outline,
which attributions of nonnatural goodness were Wctionally true,
it also prescribed an independent procedure for determining
which individual attributions were Wctionally true. According to
the Principia, attributions of nonnatural goodness are accepted
on the basis of intuition. What makes it Wctionally true that a
person is intuiting instances of nonnatural goodness is that, given
their sensibility (a sensibility shaped by Moorean doctrine), they
approve of that thing. Within the moral Wction, while nonnatural
properties are distinct from natural properties, they nevertheless
supervene on them. If a thing instantiates the (Wctionally sub-
venient) natural properties, thereby endowing it with the ten-
dency to elicit approval from persons with the appropriate
sensibility, then it is Wctionally true that it instantiates nonnatural
goodness:
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It is Wctionally true that x instantiates nonnatural goodness iV
x instantiates natural properties that would elicit the relevant
emotional attitude in a person with the appropriate sensibility.
Putting these principles together, we get a principle connecting
the emotional attitudes of the Bloomsbury group with the con-
tent of the Principia:
x instantiates natural properties that would elicit the
relevant emotional attitude in a person with the appropriate
sensibility iV according to the Principia, x instantiates nonna-
tural goodness
In this way, the Principia both controlled and gave expression to
the emotional attitudes of the Bloomsbury group.
But why did the Bloomsbury group express their amorous and
aesthetic ends in the language of morality? Why this masquer-
ade? MacIntyre suggests that, in rejecting the moral culture of
the late nineteenth century in favor of a form of life that privil-
eged the values of personal intercourse and the beautiful, what
the Bloomsbury group lacked was a means justifying their pref-
erences to others. Given the practical conXict between Victorian
morality and their preferred form of life, the Bloomsbury group
needed a means of rejecting at least those claims of Victorian
morality that were incompatible with their ends; for, if the claims
of Victorian morality were genuine, and so had the requisite
authority, then, given the precedence of moral reasons, the
reasons provided by these amorous and aesthetic ends were
potentially overridden or even cancelled. In order to justify
their rejection of Victorian morality and so pursue their pre-
ferred form of life, the Bloomsbury group needed to endow their
ends with the authority of morality.
Moore’s moral philosophy seemingly allowed them to do
just that. The acceptance of Moore’s moral philosophy was a
means of reconceiving the nonmoral reasons provided by their
Kalderon/Moral Fictionalism 04-Kalderon-chap04 Page Proof page 163 19.11.2004 10:25pm
Attitude, Affect, and Authority  163
preferences as moral reasons with the requisite authority. So
doing seemingly allowed the Bloomsbury group to justify their
form of life to their Victorian critics. Far from being at odds with
morality, the privileging of the aesthetic and the amorous was
precisely what morality required—at least from the perspective
of the Moorean Wction that they accepted. However, insofar as
these amorous and aesthetic ends provided reasons for acting in
a given circumstance, what reason they actually provided lacked
the authority of morality. Apparent instances of nonnatural
goodness were merely shadows cast by amorous and aesthetic
ends held independently of morality.
If moral practice were in this way Wctionalist, then a cognitive
reconstruction of moral practice would be required. We would
need to turn from the shadows cast on the Platonic cave and
look into the light: the noncognitive norms governing moral
acceptance would need to be replaced by norms appropriate to
the cognition of moral facts. Such a replacement would be not
only epistemically required, but normatively required as well.
The noncognitive norms governing moral acceptance would
need to be replaced not only to justiWably believe the moral
proposition expressed but also to justiWably act on the accepted
moral sentence. The normative diYculty, after all, was that, in
accepting moral sentences by noncognitive norms, competent
speakers were accepting nonmoral reasons that were potentially
overridden or cancelled in the given circumstance and so were
potentially accepting no legitimate reasons at all. In the situation
that MacIntyre describes, practical rationality requires justiWed
moral belief, and a cognitive reconstruction of moral practice
is needed before competent speakers can justiWably believe
any moral proposition. Given the normative diYculty envisioned
by MacIntyre, moral Wctionalism, if accepted as a correct
description of the way moral acceptance actually functions,
would naturally lead to a revised and reconceived moral
practice.
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Benign Moral Fictionalism?
Moral Wctionalism, however, is not necessarily committed to the
normative diYculty envisioned by MacIntyre.
The diYculty with there being moral facts that moral accept-
ance fails to track is an instance of a more general diYculty. If
there were moral facts and the acceptance of a moral sentence
was at variance with the norms appropriate to their cognition,
then in accepting a moral sentence a competent speaker would
potentially be mistaking a nonmoral reason for acting in the
given circumstance for a moral reason with the requisite author-
ity. The more general diYculty is mistaking nonmoral reasons
for moral reasons—reasons with the requisite authority. The
authority of morality is manifest in the functional role that
moral acceptance plays in moral discourse and in the cognitive
psychology of competent speakers. SpeciWcally, in accepting a
moral sentence S that he understands, not only does a competent
speaker accept a reason that takes precedence over nonmoral
reasons, that is not contingent upon his acceptance of it, for
which there is a grounds not only for him but for everyone to
accept, but the competent speaker in uttering S demands that
everyone accept S. Moral realists maintain that cognition of the
moral facts best explains and renders intelligible the authoritative
role that moral acceptance plays. However, moral authority need
not be understood as the moral realist understands it. It is at least
conceivable that, even if there were no moral facts, there would
nevertheless be a legitimate distinction between reasons that
possess the authority characteristic of morality and those that
lack it. If this distinction can be made without commitment to
the moral facts, and if in accepting a moral sentence competent
speakers accept a moral reason, then a Wctionalist moral practice
need not be the kind of cultural disaster that MacIntyre describes.
Let us begin with the notion of a reason. Even if one denied
that there were moral facts, one might nevertheless claim that
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there were facts about reasons. However, if one denied that there
were moral facts one might deny as well that there were facts
about reasons—perhaps the normative character of each pre-
sents similar obstacles to regarding both moral and normative
discourse as being fully factual. Let us consider these options in
turn.
Suppose there are no moral facts but there are facts about
reasons. Nevertheless, a distinction might be drawn between
moral and nonmoral reasons. Among the reasons that there
are, some have the authority constitutive of being a moral reason.
We typically convey moral reasons by means of moral utterance,
but in so doing we are engaged in an act of quasi-assertion. We
invoke a moral Wction in order to describe a particular kind of
reason that is allegedly available in the given circumstance.
Competent speakers convey that a feature of their circumstance
has the normative signiWcance that it does by invoking the
metaphysical Wction of moral properties that supervene on
those features and that ground their normative signiWcance. So,
while the Wctional content of a moral utterance is a moral
proposition, its real content represents a particular kind of rea-
son—a reason with the requisite authority. There is a potential
diYculty with this position, though perhaps not an insurmount-
able one. On the present view, there are facts about reasons and
some of them are moral reasons. How is it that moral facts are
not simply identiWed with the moral reasons? How are we to
distinguish moral reasons from moral facts? If we cannot, then
the present view collapses into a rationalist moral realism.
This diYculty might favor the second option. Suppose there
are no moral facts and no facts about reasons either. Suppose,
more speciWcally, that talk of reasons had a noncognitivist use,
though not necessarily a nonfactualist one. How might this
work? Recall Gibbard’s (1990) strategy. Suppose that something’s
being a reason is understood as treating it as a reason. Suppose,
moreover, that treating something as a reason is to accept a norm
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that prescribes that it count in favor of something. Then there
will be norms corresponding to reasons, and whatever can be
expressed in terms of reasons can be expressed in terms of
norms. Suppose a competent speaker accepts that a feature of
his circumstance is a reason to perform an action. While the
Wctional content of that claim involves the representation of a
reason, it conveys the speaker’s acceptance of a system of norms
that requires treating that feature as counting in favor of the
relevant action. Among the reasons, so understood, a distinction
might be drawn between moral and nonmoral reasons.
So there are two ways to distinguish moral and nonmoral
reasons while denying the existence of a distinctively moral range
of fact. One might accept that there are facts, about reasons and
that some are distinctively moral, or one might deny not only
that there are moral facts, but that there are facts about reasons
as well (assigning, instead, a noncognitive use to our talk of
reasons) and accept that some of the reasons that we recognize
are distinctively moral. While the former option is a kind of weak
noncognitivism, the latter option is a kind of strong noncogniti-
vism. On the former option, a competent speaker in accepting a
moral sentence accepts a moral reason where moral reasons are
conceived as a kind of fact. While moral acceptance is not belief
in a moral proposition, it is belief in a proposition that represents
a kind of reason. On the latter option, a competent speaker in
accepting a moral sentence accepts a moral reason where moral
reasons are not conceived as a kind of fact. While moral accept-
ance is not belief in a moral proposition, neither is it belief in any
other proposition. Mixed accounts are possible as well. Thus,
on the present account, moral acceptance not only involves
thoughts and perceptions that represent the morally salient
facts about the relevant circumstance, but crucially involves a
phenomenologically vivid sense of the moral reasons apparently
available in the circumstance as it is understood to be. However,
if minimalism is correct, these attitudes are not distinct: the
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thoughts and perceptions involved in moral acceptance are
events in a person’s consciousness whose structure constitutes
the relevant aVect. For present purposes, however, it does not
matter which of these options are embraced so long as the denial
of moral fact can be combined with the claim that some reasons
are distinctively moral reasons and that these are the reasons
involved in moral acceptance. As long as this distinction can be
marked without postulating moral facts, and noncognitive moral
acceptance involves the acceptance of moral reasons, then we
can avoid the normative diYculty that MacIntyre envisions.
Attitude and Authority
Suppose that authoritative reasons can be operationally charac-
terized in terms of the functional role they play in moral dis-
course and in the cognitive psychology of competent speakers.
Perhaps a suitably complex yet coherently integrated system of
noncognitive attitudes could implement that functional role in a
way that would render intelligible why moral reasons would
exhibit that role. Indeed, Blackburn (1998) and Gibbard (1990)
each give accounts of roughly this form. Blackburn vividly ex-
presses this approach as follows:
We should think in terms of a staircase of practical and emotional
ascent. At the bottom are simple preferences, likes, and dislikes. More
insistent is basic hostility to some kind of action or character or situ-
ation: a primitive aversion to it, or a disposition to be disgusted by it, or
to hold it in contempt, or to be angered by it, or to avoid it. We can then
ascend to reactions to such reactions. Suppose you become angry at
someone’s behaviour. I may become angry at you for being angry, and
I may express this by saying that it is none of your business. Perhaps it
was a private matter. At any rate, it is not a moral issue. Suppose on the
other hand, I share your anger or feel ‘‘at one’’ with you for so reacting.
It may stop there, but I may also feel strongly disposed to encourage
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others to share the same anger. But then I am clearly treating the matter
as one of public concern, something like a moral issue. I have come to
regard the sentiment as legitimate. Going up another step, the senti-
ment may even be compulsory in my eyes, meaning that I become
prepared to express hostility to those who do not themselves share it.
Going up another level, I may also think that this hostility is compulsory,
and be prepared to come into conXict with thosewho, while themselves
concerned at what was done, tolerate those who do not care about it. I
shall be regarding dissent as beyond the pale, unthinkable. This should
all be seen as an ascending staircase, a spiral of emotional identiWcations
and demands. The staircase gives us a scale between pure preference, on
the one hand, and attitudes with all the Xavor of ethical commitment,
on the other. (Blackburn, 1998: 9)
Suppose that something’s being a reason is a matter of treating
it as a reason. Suppose, moreover, that treating something as
reason is to accept a norm that prescribes that it count in favor
of something. Then, there will be norms corresponding to
reasons, and it might seem that whatever can be expressed in
terms of reasons can be expressed in terms of norms understood
as noncognitive attitudes. So instead of grounding reasons we
might speak of higher-order attitudes. Suppose that, in accepting
the wrongness of abortion, Bernice accepts a norm forbidding
abortion if pregnant. Suppose, moreover, that she accepts higher-
order norms that prescribe that she accept that norm, that every-
one accept that norm whether or not they in fact accept it, and
that she demand that others accept that norm. The authority of
the demandmight then be grounded in the higher-order attitudes
that prescribe it. The general idea is that higher-order attitudes
regulate which lower-order attitudes to accept and hence which
features of the circumstance are to count as reasons. It is this
regulative role in determining what counts as a reason that
explains why the authority of the demand is grounded in the
higher-order attitudes that prescribe it. Thus, the demand con-
veyed by Bernice’s moral utterance would not be manipulative,
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and accommodating that demand could be a correction of atti-
tude.
It is doubtful, however, whether higher-order attitudes could
be the grounds of authority. There are three closely related
grounds for doubt.
Suppose that Edgar accepts a higher-order norm prescribing
that he accepts a norm prescribing guilt if he frustrates the
expectations of others. Suppose, however, that Bernice expects
Edgar to take the blame for her wrongdoing. Edgar may be
socially obliging, but he is nobody’s patsy: he is not disposed to
feel guilty for not taking the blame. Indeed, he is not disposed
to feel guilty because he accepts a norm that forbids guilt in those
circumstances. So Edgar accepts a higher-order norm that con-
Xicts with a lower-order norm that he also accepts. How might
this conXict between higher- and lower-order attitudes be re-
solved? Edgar might revise the lower-order norm forbidding guilt
since it is inconsistent with a higher-order norm that he accepts.
Indeed, this is part of the reason for thinking that higher-order
attitudes could be the grounds of impersonal authority: the
higher-order norms regulate which lower-order norms to accept
and hence which features of the circumstance are to count as
reasons. This is an illusion, however. Edgar might equally revise
the higher-order norm. He may be obliging, and continue to be,
but his confrontationwith Bernice might reveal that obligingness
has its limits, and he might revise his higher-order attitudes to
reXect this. Everything else being equal, it is good when higher-
and lower-order attitudes cohere, but when they conXict coher-
ence can be achieved by revising either. But this undermines the
idea that higher-order attitudes are authoritative: if higher-order
attitudes regulate which lower-order attitudes to adopt, then
coherence should be achieved only by revising lower-order atti-
tudes but coherence may be achieved by revising higher-order
attitudes as well. (Compare Watson’s, 1975: 108–9, criticism of
Frankfurt, 1971. Scanlon, 1998: 54–5, makes essentially the same
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criticism of desire models of reasons that appeal to higher-order
desires.)
There is a second related ground for doubt. Higher-order
attitudes diVer from lower-order attitudes. SpeciWcally, they
diVer in their objects: While higher-order attitudes have lower-
order attitudes as objects, lower-order attitudes do not. But how
could attitudes of fundamentally the same kind diVer in author-
ity when the only relevant diVerence is an intrinsic diVerence in
object? If there was a puzzle about how certain lower-order
attitudes could be authoritative all by themselves, it is hard to
see how this puzzle could be resolved by appealing to attitudes of
fundamentally the same kind that diVer only in object. This
diVerence in object could not ground the authority that the
latter allegedly has over the former. The point is easier to
appreciate if, instead of the higher-order attitudes, that a person
bears to his own attitudes we consider the higher-order attitudes
that he bears to the attitudes of others. Suppose that Bernice is
angry at Edgar. Suppose that Edgar feels that Bernice’s anger
is unwarranted. He might be angry at her for being angry. In
this emotional conXict, it is wrong to think that Edgar’s anger
is authoritative just because it has Bernice’s attitude as an
object—Edgar, after all, may be being unreasonable. Higher-
order attitudes are higher-order not in the sense that lower-
order attitudes answer to them, but only in the sense that they
have lower-order attitudes as objects.
There is a third related ground for doubt. There are two ways
to describe the case where Edgar revises the lower-order attitude
incompatible with the higher-order attitude that he accepts: the
case might be described as a mere change in attitude, or it might
be described as a correction of attitude. Suppose that the higher-
order norm is authoritative. Then revising the lower-order norm
is not merely a change in attitude, but a correction of attitude.
However, if, as the noncognitivist conceives of it, the conXict is
between attitudes that cannot be jointly satisWed where the only
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relevant diVerence is an intrinsic diVerence in object, then there is
no reason to think that the revision is anything other than a
change in attitude. If the conXict were between accepting some-
thing as a reason for an attitude and accepting a reason that
discounts that thing as a reason for that attitude, then the revision
would be a correction of attitude. In the latter case, the relevant
diVerence is not an intrinsic diVerence in object but a diVerence
in the reasons for attitudes that intrinsically diVer in object.
The point is easier to appreciate if we consider the case where
Edgar has all the relevant higher-order attitudes without regard-
ing them as authoritative. Suppose that Edgar was raised to
be socially obliging by domineering and psychologically adroit
parents. Though Edgar cannot shake these attitudes, he can see
no reason for acting on them. In these circumstances, if Edgar
revises the lower-order attitude forbidding guilt, the revision
would be a change of attitude and not a correction of attitude,
since the revision is not a reXection of the reasons he accepts.
Michael Smith describes a similar case in objecting to Blackburn
(1998):
[W]e can readily imagine someone who (say) has a desire that people
keep their promises, and who shares many other people’s anger at
those who fail to keep their promises, and who feels disposed to
encourage others to share the same anger too, and who feels disposed
to be angry at those who don’t share that anger, and yet who doesn’t
regard any of these sentiments as being in the least legitimate. We need
simply to imagine someone who, in addition, regards all his various
attitudes towards promising in much the same way as the unwilling
addict regards his addiction. He might think, for example, that these
attitudes were all simply caused in him by social forces, in much the
same way as the ingestion of drugs caused the unwilling addict’s desire
to take drugs in him, and that no reasons can therefore be given in
support of acting on the basis of these attitudes, much as the addict
thinks that no reason can be given for acting on his desire to take drugs.
(Smith, 2001: 111–12)
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Thus, in representing a correction of attitude in terms that
could only represent a change in attitude, the noncognitivist fails
to account for the authority of moral utterance. The demands
they convey may be prescribed by a coherently integrated system
of higher-order attitudes, but, nonetheless, such demands may be
manipulative, and accommodating themmight be a mere change
of attitude.
It is doubtful whether noncognitivism, even in its Wctionalist
guise, could account for moral authority in terms of a coherently
integrated system of higher-order attitudes. Even if no such
account could succeed, perhaps the authority of morality could
be vindicated in some other way by the noncognitivist. Nothing
I have said so far has suggested otherwise.
A noncognitivist that maintains that moral acceptance is desire
in the directed attention sense, and maintains as well a minim-
alist account of that attitude must—on independent grounds—
provide another account of moral authority. Recall that desire in
the directed attention sense can be characterized in terms of its
functional role: in terms of the tendency for certain features of
the circumstance to become salient in perception, thought, and
imagination and the tendency for these features to present a
certain normative appearance. The tendency for certain features
of the circumstance to become salient and the tendency for these
features to present a certain normative appearance would be
both intelligible and well explained by the acceptance of norms
that prescribe that these features have that normative signiW-
cance. Thus, accounts of moral authority in terms of a coher-
ently integrated system of higher-order attitudes would be the
basis of an explanation for the functional role of the relevant
aVect. The minimalist, however, denies that desire in the directed
attention sense is an attitude whose nature can be speciWed
independently of its functional role, and that can explain and
render intelligible why this attitude has that role. Given this, a
noncognitivist that maintains that moral acceptance is desire in
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the directed attention sense and maintains as well a minimalist
account of that attitude must account for moral authority in
some other way.
Intransigence and Authority
Without speculating about how this might be done, let us
consider a speciWc challenge to moral authority, given the pre-
sent grounds for noncognitivism.
Recall that the argument from intransigence has three prem-
ises. First, public cognition is noncomplacent: if acceptance is
cognitive and on behalf of others, then in the context of a
disagreement in reasons, if a person is interested in accepting
S on behalf of others, then he would thereby have a reason to re-
examine the grounds of acceptance. Second, moral acceptance is
authoritative: given its authority, moral acceptance is always
acceptance on behalf of others. Third, moral acceptance is in-
transigent: in the context of a disagreement about reasons, a
person interested in accepting S on behalf of others does not
thereby have a reason to re-examine the grounds of moral
acceptance.
To see how these claims constitute an argument for noncog-
nitivism, Wrst consider noncomplacency. If acceptance is cognitive
and on behalf of others, then, in the context of a disagreement in
reasons, if a person is interested in accepting S on behalf of others,
he would have a reason to re-examine the grounds of acceptance.
It follows that, if moral acceptance is cognitive and on behalf of
others, then, in the context of a disagreement about reasons, if a
person is interested in accepting a moral sentence on behalf
of others, he would have a reason to re-examine the grounds of
moral acceptance. This in turn entails that if, in the context of
a disagreement about reasons, a person lacks a reason to re-
examine the grounds of moral acceptance and moral acceptance
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is on behalf of others, then the moral acceptance is noncognitive.
Notice that the antecedent of this conditional is just the conjunc-
tion of intransigence and authority. Moral acceptance is intransi-
gent: in normal circumstances we are under no obligation to re-
examine the foundations of moral claims that we accept, even if
they are disputed byotherwise rational and reasonable, informed,
and interested people who accept reasons that, if genuine, would
undermine them.Moreover, given its authority, moral acceptance
is acceptance on behalf of others. This could be only so if moral
acceptance were noncognitive.
Even if a cognitivist were to resist this argument by denying
intransigence, there would, nevertheless, be an important nor-
mative lesson to be learned. Being unmoved to further inquiry is
subject to epistemic criticism since it violates norms appropriate
to moral belief. The envisioned cognitivist would claim that
being unmoved to further inquiry is subject to epistemic criti-
cism because moral acceptance is cognitive, and if moral accept-
ance is cognitive, then, in the context of a disagreement about
reasons, an interested person has a reason to inquire further into
the grounds of moral acceptance. Not only is being unmoved to
further inquiry subject to epistemic criticism, but it is subject to
moral criticism as well. The claim that if moral acceptance is
cognitive then, in the context of a disagreement about reasons,
an interested person has a reason to inquire further into the
grounds of moral acceptance is a consequence of noncompla-
cency and authority. So the noncomplacent character of moral
acceptance is, in part, a manifestation of the authority of a
cognitive moral practice. So from the cognitivist’s perspective,
being unmoved to further inquiry could only be a symptom of an
underlying moral debility since the authority of morality would
thereby be undermined.
Can an independent question be raised—one not involving
any cognitivist assumptions—about the compatibility of intransi-
gence and authority? Perhaps.
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An interpretation of the formula of humanity makes vivid the
problem. Consider again Putnam’s (1981: 165) reaction to funda-
mental disagreement:
To be perfectly honest, there is in each of us something akin to
contempt, not for the other’s mind—for we each have the highest regard
for each other’s minds—nor for the other as a person—, for I have more
respect for my colleague’s honesty, integrity, kindness, etc., than I do
for that of many people who agree with my ‘‘liberal’’ political views—
but for a certain complex of emotions and judgments in the other.
What Putnam holds in something akin to contempt is
Nozick’s moral sensibility—a moral sensibility that privileges
property rights over what Putnam regards as the compassionate
treatment of the less well oV. The question is whether something
akin to contempt is the right attitude to adopt towards someone
who in your view is lacking ‘in a certain kind of sensitivity and
perception.’ Even if someone were lacking in this way, to treat
him as an end is to treat him as capable, at least in principle, of
acquiring the requisite sensitivity and perception. Moreover, to
treat someone as an end is to allow for the possibility, however
remote, that you yourself are lacking in this way. The diYculty of
course is that contemptuousness is inconsistent with both these
attitudes.
Treating someone as an end involves oVering them reasons
and treating them as capable of assessing those reasons. Con-
versely, it is to treat the reasons they oVer as potentially genuine
reasons that they are in a position to assess. It is this latter aspect
of the formula of humanity that is presently relevant. What
would it be, in the context of a disagreement about reasons,
for Edgar to treat the reasons that Bernice oVers as potentially
genuine reasons that she is in a position to assess? It would
involve, at a minimum, an openness to reXective doubt about
his own grounds for the permissibility of abortion. This, in
conjunction with an interest in accepting on behalf of others a
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claim about the moral status of abortion, is suYcient to motivate
further inquiry into the grounds of moral acceptance. Edgar
would have a motive to inquire further into the grounds of
moral acceptance to determine whether, in light of his discussion
with Bernice, his reasons for acceptance are good reasons. He
would also have a motive to inquire further to determine, in light
of his discussion with Bernice, what, if anything, there is to
Bernice’s reasons for rejection. Bernice, after all, might be onto
something that so far eludes Edgar. Adopting the end of further
inquiry is not only to strive to be responsive to what reasons
there are, but to treat Bernice as an end and not merely as a
means.
Of course, there is latitude in the fulWlment of this end.
Further inquiry is one end among many and a person’s ends
must be rationally ordered—perhaps Edgar has more compelling
immediate concerns. Particular actions taken to fulWl this end are
epistemically meritorious, while particular failures to fulWl this
end merely lack epistemic merit and are not in any way epistem-
ically blameworthy (though perhaps adopting the policy of never
acting to fulWl this end would be). There is an additional reason
why adopting the end of further inquiry should display this
normative structure. In this context, striving to be responsive
to what reasons there are is to strive for moral perfection, to
better respond to authoritative reasons. So, not only are actions
taken to fulWl this end epistemically meritorious, but such actions
are morally meritorious as well. Similarly, not only do particular
failures to fulWl this end lack epistemic merit, such failures lack
moral merit as well. Moreover, just as particular failures are not
epistemically blameworthy, such failures are not morally blame-
worthy (though perhaps adopting the policy of never inquiring
further would be). It is not surprising, then, that striving to be
responsive authoritative reasons should display this normative
structure, a normative structure plausibly assigned to perfection-
ist duties.
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Edgar, of course, need not revise his moral opinion. Treating
Bernice as an end need not involve Edgar’s abandoning the claim
that abortion is morally permissible, only that he be prepared to
bracket his full acceptance of that claim when inquiring further.
Nor need it involve a partial normative accommodation of
Bernice’s position—perhaps on due reXection her position on
abortion has nothing to recommend. What it does require is that
Edgar adopt the end of further inquiry. In this context, striving to
be responsive to what reasons there are is a manifestation of
moral virtue.
Intransigence is plausibly incompatible with moral authority.
In the context of a disagreement about reasons, for Edgar to treat
the reasons that Bernice oVers as potentially genuine reasons that
she is in a position to assess would involve, at a minimum, an
openness to reXective doubt about his own grounds for the
permissibility of abortion. This, in conjunction with Edgar’s
interest in accepting on behalf of others a claim about the
moral status of abortion, would be suYcient reason to inquire
further into the grounds of moral acceptance. Notice that the
requirement that Edgar be open to reXective doubt is a norma-
tive and not an epistemic requirement—it is part of what it is, in
this context, to treat Bernice as an end. Moreover, the plausibility
of this normative requirement is independent of the cognitive
status of moral acceptance. It merely presupposes that there are
reasons for acceptance, but this would be plausible even if moral
acceptance were noncognitive. So, given an interpretation of the
formula of humanity, intransigence can be shown to be incom-
patible with moral authority without making any cognitivist
assumptions.
If, according to the norms that govern moral acceptance,
moral intransigence is intelligible, then such norms are subject
to normative criticism. It is arguable that, under certain condi-
tions, the apparent intelligibility of moral intransigence would
fail to appropriately value the humanity of others. If that is right,
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then moral inquiry should be revised so as to become noncom-
placent. The norms governing the acceptance of a moral sen-
tence should be revised at least to the extent that, in the context
of a disagreement about reasons, a competent speaker interested
in the acceptability of S would be under a lax obligation to
inquire further into the grounds of moral acceptance, at least if
his disputant is otherwise rational and reasonable, informed,
internally coherent, and similarly interested in the acceptability
of S.
Renewed Moral Inquiry
In accepting a moral sentence that he understands, a competent
speaker accepts as well what reason is thereby provided. Suppose
a question is raised about the authority of these reasons given the
norms that govern moral acceptance. Suppose, that is, that a
questioned is raised about whether there are authoritative
reasons that moral acceptance fails to track. Given the claims
such reasons make on us, there would be reason to renew moral
inquiry. Notice that the motivation is normative and not merely
epistemic. If it were an open question whether there were
authoritative reasons that moral acceptance fails to track, then
moral inquiry, as it is actually conducted, would be potentially
subject to normative criticism. There would thus be a normative
and not merely epistemic reason to renew moral inquiry.
Moral Wctionalism is consistent with the existence of the
moral facts, and so it is logically possible that there are moral
facts that moral acceptance fails to track. Moreover, if there were,
there would be authoritative reasons that moral acceptance fails
to track. However, this logical possibility is not suYcient to
engender reXective doubt any more than the logical possibility
that I am in the Matrix is. However, if moral intransigence were
intelligible, then, as I have argued, a question could indeed be
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raised about whether there are authoritative reasons that moral
acceptance fails to track. If, on whatever grounds, it were an
open question whether moral acceptance tracks authoritative
reasons, there would be reason to renew moral inquiry.
What form would such renewed moral inquiry take?
In order for renewed moral inquiry to be noncomplacent, it
would need to be self-consciously conducted as a public inquiry.
After all, it is partly for the sake of others that that one should
strive to be responsive to what reasons there are—that, in the
context of a disagreement about reasons, one should adopt the
end of further inquiry. It is nonaccidental that the results of such
deliberation and, indeed, the deliberation itself can be presented
in the medium of public language. Moral conversation, broadly
conceived, is the proper medium of any such inquiry.
Renewed moral inquiry, so conceived, would not necessarily
have as its aim the construction of a general and comprehensive
moral theory. While a general and comprehensive theory for
which there was noncollusive agreement among reasonable and
rational people engaged in the joint endeavor of moral inquiry
would be theoretically satisfying, it is unlikely to be achieved; nor
should the aim of morally inquiry be anything so ambitious. The
aim of renewed moral inquiry, rather, is to clarify our moral
vocabulary and the grounds upon which we accept moral claims,
to increase the coherence of the moral claims that we accept, and
so on. This might result in a general and comprehensive theory,
but then again it might not.
In clarifying moral vocabulary and the grounds on which we
accept moral claims, and in increasing the overall coherence of
our moral views, moral inquiry would rely on ordinary forms
of public moral reasoning supplemented, where appropriate, by
philosophical reXection. A philosophical theory of morality is
by no means the grounds of moral inquiry. Rather, an adequate
philosophical theory of morality would itself be grounded in the
deliveries of moral inquiry.
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As an illustration of this, consider the following: Suppose that
renewed moral inquiry were undertaken not to redress the
apparent intelligibility of moral intransigence, but to discover
the moral facts if there are any. Having made a signiWcant
advance in the clarity and coherence of our moral views, even
if large areas of disagreement remain, philosophical reXection on
what has in fact been achieved might determine the cognitive
status of that inquiry. In reXecting on the deliveries of the
philosophically reWned, public, moral reasoning we might be in
a position to determine whether such reasoning was a form of
moral cognition or whether the acceptance of moral claims on
the basis of such reasoning remained noncognitive. In this way, a
renewed moral inquiry might discover the moral facts if there are
any.
If renewed moral inquiry essentially relies on ordinary forms
of public moral reasoning, then what hope is there in its making
any advance over actual moral debate? Two features of renewed
moral inquiry are relevant here. First, moral inquiry is self-
consciously conducted as a public inquiry—a cooperative ven-
ture whose end is acceptance on behalf of others. Moreover, it is
a public inquiry that is motivated in a certain way. The point of
engaging in renewed moral inquiry is for the participants in
a moral Wction to assure themselves that there are not authori-
tative reasons that moral acceptance fails to track. This is an
instance of what Rawls (1999: essay 22) has described as the
burdens of reasons. The burdens of reasons are obstacles to a
reasonable assessment of the moral reasons available in a given
circumstance. The fact that moral acceptance is so burdened has
normative implications for the conduct of moral discussion.
After all, a fair-minded appreciation of the diYculties involved
in assessing the authoritative reasons available in a given circum-
stance will aVect how one interacts with others who disagree—
even those who would disagree on fundamental matters. So
renewed moral inquiry would be governed by reasonable
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precepts not only because it is a cooperative venture, but because
of the motivation for embarking on that venture in the Wrst
place. That renewed moral inquiry is subject to the precepts of
reasonableness is what distinguishes it from all too familiar forms
of moral combat.
What are the precepts of reasonableness that are a reasonable
response to the burdens of reasons?
Since it is a cooperative venture that aims at reasonable
consensus insofar as that is possible within the moral domain,
it should be conducted in a manner conducive to that aim. While
disagreements may reasonably persist, there is no place for
intransigence here. In the face of reasonable disagreement,
allowing for the possibility, however remote, that one’s grounds
for accepting a claim are not decisive is not only a reasonable
precept of cooperative inquiry but also a rational response to the
burdens of reasons.
Not only should moral inquiry be conducted in a manner
conducive to that aim, but basic disagreement should be reason-
ably accommodated as well. Suppose that reasonable people
engaged in the joint endeavor of moral inquiry assess an action
in a given circumstance by fundamentally diVerent principles
that practically conXict. One way in which such basic moral
disagreement might be reasonably accommodated is to build a
partial consensus on the basis of what can be agreed to. Working
from this partial normative accommodation, the parties should
try, insofar as possible, to understand what, if anything, the other
is responding to. Persistent disagreements, even if basic, should
be approached from a perspective that emphasizes what is un-
doubtedly a large measure of agreement. Doing so not only
lessens the temptation to see the other as a moral monster but
also provides a starting point for reasonable discussion.
As an example of this, consider how the abortion debate has
changed. In the early stages of that debate, no defender of a
woman’s right to an abortion would concede that abortion was
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a bad thing, a Wt object of regret even if justiWed. But that much is
now conceded. Similarly, in the early stages of the debate, no
prolifer would concede that abortion ought to be legally permit-
ted even if morally forbidden. But that much is conceded, at least
by many, no doubt in recognition that a decision to abort is a
hard moral choice, combined with the conviction that people
should make up their own minds about hard moral choices. This
might suggest that the abortion debate has changed because the
parties have partially accommodated the moral insights of one
another. And this partial normative accommodation is plausibly a
response to the reasons brought to bear by each side.
(I am unsure, however, whether this is the right account of the
way in which the abortion debate has changed. The failure, early
on, of the defender of abortion rights to concede publicly that an
abortion is a Wt object of regret might also plausibly be a
rhetorical omission. Perhaps it was not conceded, not because
it was rejected, but rather because to so concede would weaken
the moral case for legalizing abortion. After all, it is hard to
imagine a reasonably sensitive woman who actually had an
abortion who did not at least concede the potential for legitimate
regret, and so hard to believe that abortion being a Wt object of
regret was actually rejected. If that is right, then there was in fact
no accommodation in this respect, and hence the change was not
a response to the reasons brought to bear by pro-life advocates.
Similarly, the concession by many that abortion ought to be
legally permitted even if morally forbidden might merely be
the counsel of despair prompted by the realization that the
state-sanctioned mass slaughter of the innocent is a permanent
feature of modern society. If that is right, then there was in fact
no accommodation in this respect, and hence the change was not
a response to the reasons brought to bear by pro-choice advo-
cates. If this is the right account of the way in which the abortion
debate has changed, then there was no tendency towards partial
normative accommodation.)
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These are not the only precepts of reasonableness. Rawls
(1999) mentions, in addition, the reasonable expectation of dis-
agreement and the crediting of one’s interlocutor with good
faith. There are undoubtedly others. I will not attempt to give
anything like a comprehensive list, not least because such pre-
cepts should be determined, at least in part, from within the
renewed moral inquiry. Just as other disciplines, whether psycho-
physics or econometrics, determine the methodology appropri-
ate to their aim, so too should moral inquiry determine the
methodology appropriate to its aim. So there is no saying in
advance of such an inquiry what all of the precepts of reason-
ableness would be.
Moral inquiry here described is in some ways ideal. It is not
ideal in the way that the Kingdom of Ends or Plato’s Republic
are; such an inquiry might be actually implemented in a way that
the Kingdom of Ends or the Republic might not. Rather, it is
ideal in that it is no substitute for practical deliberation. Due to
inevitable practical exigencies, a decision to act or refrain from
acting in a given circumstance might not wait on a consensus
that may or may not emerge from moral inquiry. The partici-
pants of a renewed moral inquiry may have to act on moral
reasons that they accept even if it is controversial whether such
reasons have the authority that they take them to have. However,
while moral inquiry is no substitute for practical deliberation, it
is not entirely independent from it. Moral inquiry would depend,
at least in part, on practical deliberation in that such deliberation
is a potentially fruitful object of reXection for such an inquiry.
However, just as importantly, practical deliberation would de-
pend, at least in part, on moral inquiry in that the practical
deliberation of the participants of such an inquiry would inevit-
ably be informed by that inquiry. Moral inquiry would inform
practical deliberation in at least two ways. First, moral inquiry
would have the tendency to modify what one takes to be a
morally relevant consideration in a given circumstance and so
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would aVect how one would react to Wnding oneself in that
circumstance. Second, the virtues involved in a renewed moral
inquiry would naturally generalize beyond this initial setting. So,
while moral inquiry is no substitute for practical deliberation,
neither is it independent from it.
Conclusion
Renewed moral inquiry might have a number of outcomes. At
one end of the spectrum, a revision of moral practice is both
theoretically and practically required. At the other end of the
spectrum, no such revision is required. But there are interim
possibilities. Perhaps moral practice would remain Wctionalist
even after a renewed moral inquiry but the character of the
Wction would change. Perhaps, while benign moral Wctionalism
is a legitimate possibility, the moral Wction that competent
speakers actually accept is not itself benign. Or perhaps the
actual moral Wction is in many ways benign but renewed moral
inquiry suggests ways in which that Wction could be improved.
There is no telling, in advance, what such an inquiry would
reveal.
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